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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of U tab 
AUTO LEASE COMPANY, a partnership, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
CENTRAL MUTUAL INSURANCE CO., 
a corporation, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
No. 
8746 
Brief of Defendant and Respondent 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
The defendant-respondent issued a policy of insurance to 
the plaintiff-appellant and the Bearings Service & Supply Com-
pany, which is not a party to this action, insuring five auto-
mobiles which were leased to the Bearings Service & Supply 
Company by the plaintiff-appellant. The policy covered, among 
other things, damage incurred by reason of upset or collision. 
The automobile described in the complaint of plaintiff-appellant 
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was an automobile which was being procured to replace one 
of the five leased by plaintiff-appellant to Bearings Service & 
Supply Company. The particular automobile was involved in 
a collision and damaged while it was enroute from Michigan 
to Salt Lake City, Utah. 
On a Motion For Summary Judgment the District Court 
decided that the damage to the automobile was not covered 
by the insurance policy of the defendant-respondent, and this 
appeal is taken from the court's ruling. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Motion For Summary Judgment was based on the 
pleadings in the file, the deposition of C. R. Jacobs and the 
exhibits introduced at the hearing on the Motion. These docu-
ments go to make up the record on appeal. The pleadings will 
be referred to by "R. -", the deposition by t(Dep. -'' and the 
exhibits by their number. 
C. R. Jacobs testified in his deposition that at the time 
of the accident referred to in plaintiff's complaint, February 2, 
1956, (R. 2) he was a partner with A. Palmer Holt in the 
plaintiff firm, Auto Lease Company (Dep. 2). The Auto Lease 
Company O\Vned between fifteen and twenty vehicles, all of 
\vhich \vere leased out to other persons or firms (Dep. 3). 
They had a lease (Exhibit 2) under the terms of which they 
were to supply Bearings Service & Supply Company with the 
vehicles which Bearings Service & Supply used in i~s business 
(l)ep. 4). 
PlaintiiT started furnishing Bearings Service & Supply 
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Cmnpany with automobiles about eighteen months before this 
accident occurred. In the beginning they furnished them with 
two automobiles, which were increased from time to time until 
at the time of this accident the plaintiff was furnishing Bearings 
Service & Supply Company with five automobiles ( Dep. 4). 
The automobiles were furnished on a yearly basis and were 
to be replaced with new automobiles at the end of twelve 
months' use (Dep. 4). The lease provided that the Bearings 
Service & Supply Company was to furnish insurance to cover 
the vehicles which were leased to them and had procured a 
policy from the defendant company. The plaintiff-appellant 
and the Bearings Service & Supply Company were shown as 
insured on the policy (Exhibit 1). The policy contained a fleet 
schedule describing five vehicles. Two of the vehicles originally 
insured had apparently been disposed of prior to the accident 
and two others inserted in their place. The important thing 
is that the five vehicles insured were described in the policy 
and the policy was issued in the name of Bearings Service & 
Supply Company and Auto Lease Company. The other vehicles 
owned by the plaintiff and presumably leased to other firms or 
persons were admittedly not covered by this poli~y (Dep. 5). 
The policy further provided, according to the con1plaint, 
which is admitted for the purpose of the Motion: 
"if the insured * * * acquires ownership of an-
other automobile and so notifies the company within 
thirty days following the date of its delivery, such 
insurance as is afforded by this policy applies also to 
such other autotnobile as of the date of such acquisition; 
(a) if it replaces an auto1nobile described in this 
policy, or (b) if it is an additional autornobile and 
if the company insures all automobiles owned by the 
insured * * * ." 
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At the request of Bearings Service & Supply Company the 
plaintiff-appellant had decided to replace one of the auto-
mobiles being used by Bearings Service & Supply Company in 
accordance \vith the terms of its lease (Dep. 6). As alleged in 
paragraph 4 of the complaint, a 1956 Chevrolet V-8 210 4 
door station wagon, Motor number 0011887, Serial Number 
VB 565004649, was being secured and was to replace a station 
wagon Serial number VB 55}003559, listed as item number 4 
on the fleet schedule of the defendant's policy (R. 2). The 
plaintiff-appellant secured the new automobile through a dealer, 
Wilson's Drive-away, in Chicago, Illinois. It arranged with 
the dealer to have one of his men drive the car to Salt Lake 
City but apparently delivery to the appellant was to take place 
in Chicago (Dep. 7-8). Title to the vehicle was sent to the 
plaintiff through the mail on the morning of the accident 
described in plaintiff's complaint and the car was billed to 
the plaintiff-appellant on open account. 
At the time of the accident the Bearings Service & Supply 
Cotnpany \Yas still using the vehicle which was to be replaced 
by the vehicle secured through the dealer in Chicago. The 
following appears on page 10 of the deposition: 
ttA. 
In other words, was this automobile which this 
new automobile was being acquired to replace-
did your agreement contemplate that the old 
automobile v.rould stay with them until you sup-
plied them with a new vehicle? 
Yes, that is right. 
ttQ. So at the ti1ne of this automobile accident Bear~ng 
Service & Supply still had within their possesston 
five auton1obiles ?'' 
ttA. Right." 
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According to the plaintiff's Complaint ( R. 1-2) , the vehicle 
being secured from the dealer in Chicago was wrecked in an 
automobile accident which occurred on U. S. Highway 30 
sixteen miles west of Cheyenne, Wyoming on February 2, 
1956, which was two days after it had been acquired on January 
31, 1956. Thereafter the plaintiff-appellant apparently sold 
the vehicle for salvage and received $389.51, which sum was 
paid to the plaintiff, Auto Lease Company, and the Auto 
Lease Company paid for the car, sustaining an alleged damage 
of $1,946.74. It also thereafter made demand upon the insur-
ance carrier under the aforementioned insurance policy, claim-
ing that the vehicle was covered under the provisions of the 
insurance policy for automatic coverage set out in plaintiff's 
Complaint and previously set out herein. 
The District Court held that the damaged vehicle did not 
replace an automobile described in the policy nor was it an 
additional automobile as that term is defined by said insurance 
policy, and entered judgment for the defendant-respondent. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
I. The damaged vehicle did not replace an automobile 
described in the policy or was not an additional vehicle as 
defined by the policy. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE DAMAGED VEHICLE DID NOT REPLACE AN 
.-\UT01t10Bil.E DESCRIBED IN Tl-IE POLICY OR \Y/ AS 
NOT AN ADDITIONAL VEHICLE AS DEFINED BY THE 
POLICY. 
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The construction and application of the automatic insur-
ance clause or substitution provision of an automobile liability 
or indemnity policy_ is discussed in an annotation beginning at 
34 A.L.R. 2d 93 7, from which the following quotations are 
taken: 
((No citation of authority is required to support the 
proposition that in the absence of a provision for the 
extension of coverage of an automobile liability or 
indemnity policy to automobiles other than those de-
scribed in the policy, or of specific approval of the 
change, the insurer does not cover the insured's liability 
resulting from the use of such other automobiles. 
··This annotation * * * concerns itself essentially 
with three types of provisions which have found their 
way into automobile liability and indemnity policies 
in recent years, and whose common feature is that they 
are all intended to provide coverage, under specified 
conditions, for vehicles not described in the policy, 
without the necessity of first securing the insurer's 
approval to the change or addition. 
··with some exceptions, the first two of these pro-
visions, the ·replacement' provision and the ·blanket' 
or •fleet' provision, are generally found in the same 
clause, the so-called ·automatic insurance' clause, under 
which coverage is extended automatically to newly 
acquired automobiles, the (replacement' provision deal-
ing v;ith automobiles acquired to replace those de-
scribed in the policy, the (blanket' or (fleet' provision 
\Vith those added to the already insured vehicles. 
* * * * * 
ttln Home lvlut. Ins. Co. v. Rose ( 1945, CA8th 
Neb.) 150 F 2d 201, the court stated that the tau~o­
rnatic insurance' clause in standard policies was to-
tended to meet the necessity for tnaintaining continu-
ous insurance on cars in the presence of the recognized 
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custom among insured owners of acquiring other cars 
by replacement and new purchases during the life of 
their policies. 
* * * * * 
Ct Another prerequisite to coverage, based on the cap-
tion of the (automatic insurance' clause, as well as on 
the phrase (acquires ownership of another automobile,' 
in the introductory portion, which recurs throughout 
the clause in the words (such other automobile,' is that 
the insured acquire (ownership' of the automobile 
claimed to be covered. 
* * * * * ((In view of the express provision of the (automatic 
insurance' clause that coverage of the new automobile 
commences on the date of its delivery, it is evident that 
such delivery is an essential prerequisite to coverage. 
((In Dean v. Niagara Fire Ins. Co. ( 193 7) 24 Cal 
App 2d Supp 762, 68 P2d 1021, the fact that at the 
time of the accident the car described in the policy 
was still registered in the insured's name, while the 
car he was driving was not yet registered, was held not 
to preclude coverage of the second car, the court stating 
that the word (delivery' in this context had the ordinary 
meaning of a handing over of physical possession and 
control of the automobile, and that insurance coverage 
attached to the replacing automobile as of the date of 
such delivery, provided the insured, either prior or 
subsequent to delivery, acquired the legal status of 
registered owner. It was further held, however, that 
if the insured, at the time of the accident, was driving 
the car simply to try it out, with a view to its possible 
purchase, the insurer could not be liable. 
* * * * * 
CtOne of the primary requirements of the (replace-
ment' provision is that the new automobile (replaces' 
an automobile described in the policy. 
* * * * * I 
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((But in Mitcham v. Travelers Indem. Co. (1942, CA 
4th NC) 127 F 2d 27, it was held that a car purchased 
by the insured was not within the protection of the 
policy in view of the fact that the new automobile de-
scribed in the policy was not traded in for the new 
car, but was left v1ith the dealer to be sold, with the 
title remaining in the insured. Pointing out that the 
insured could at any time have taken the old car from 
the custody of the dealer and put it into use, or that 
the dealer could have used the car on the insured's 
behalf in order to demonstrate it to a customer, and 
that in either case it would still have been covered 
by the policy, the court stated that these circumstances 
distinguished the case from Merchants Mut. Casualty 
Co. v. Lambert (1940) 90 NH 507, 11 A 2d 361, 127 
ALR 483, supra, where the old car was not in condition 
to be driven on the public highway." 
Thus, it will be seen that in order for an automobile to 
be covered as an additional automobile under the automatic 
provision of the policy the automobile must actually be de-
livered to the insured and he must actually have the right to 
and assume custody, possession and control of the automobile. 
This is illustrated by two cases: 
In Main lnv. Co. of Passaic v. United States Fidelity & 
Guaranty Co., 102 A. (2d) 112 (New Jersey 1953), plaintiff 
brought a declaratory judgment action to determine if a certain 
automobile was covered under the ttnewly acquired" auto-
mobile provision of the policy. The evidence showed that 
plaintiff had been negotiating with a third party for the pur-
chase of the automobile. The automobile had been stolen 
f rotn the third party and the plaintiff had sent one of its 
l'lnployees to bring it back. The tenns of the s~1le had not been 
finally agreed to by the plaintiff. On the return trip the 
10 
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employee was involved in an accident and the car was com-
pletely 'vrecked on May 28, 1952. The plaintiff actually agreed 
to purchase the car on the 6th day of June, 1952. The court 
held that the evidence was insufficient to establish insured's 
claim that he was the beneficial owner of the automobile at 
the tin1e of the accident, and further held that the plaintiff 
had failed to establish that the ('additional automobile'' pro-
vision vvould be applicable as it had not shown that the de-
fendant insured all of the automobiles owned by the plaintiff 
and that it had not shown that this was a replacement for any 
automobile owned by the plaintiff. 
The second case is Everly v. Creech, 294 P. (2d) 109 
(California 1956). The court decided in favor of the insurer 
on the theory that the insured had not given notice as required 
under the policy, but in deciding when notice should have been 
given the court discussed when the automobile was "acquired." 
The evidence showed that Everly acquired possession of such 
automobile more than thirty days prior to the accident and 
that he was in possession '(with full use of it and exercised 
dominion over it at all times" for more than thirty days prior 
to the accident. Legal title to the automobile vvas secured three 
days prior to the accident. The court held: 
"Under the circumstances here appearing, a finding 
of full use and the exercise of dominion over this car 
is equivalent to a finding of ownership within the 
meaning of the policy. \'V e think these findings were 
sufficient to support the judgment. The court found 
that Everly acquired possession of the Ford prior to 
August 25 and that he had possession \vith full use 
of it and exercised dominion over it at all tirnes there-
after up to the date of the collision. It was also found 
that it \Vas not true that he had purchased and acquired 
11 
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this car within thirty days of the accident. A clear 
intent appears from the findings as a whole to find all 
the material facts against the plaintiff, and the findings 
are sufficient for that purpose. Johndrow v. Thomas, 
31 Cal. 2d 202, 187 P. 2d 681." 
The other conclusion which we may draw from these 
authorities is that if the automobile is to be covered under the 
provision that it replaces an automobile described in the policy, 
the automobile must actually replace an automobile described 
in the policy. Illustrative of this rule is the case of Mitcham 
v. Travelers Indemnity Company, 127 Fed. (2d) 27, 4th Circuit 
Court of Appeals 1942, which has previously been referred 
to in the A.L.R. annotation and in which it was held where 
the insured did not trade in his old automobile on the purchase 
price of a new car but left the old automobile with the dealer 
for storage and sale, and did not transfer title thereto, the 
new auton1obile did not n replace" the old one, since the insured 
could have at any time taken the old automobile from the 
custody of the motor company and put it into use. 
Another case which is illustrative of this rule is Tanne1' 
v. Pennsylvania Thresherrnen & Farmer/ Mutual Casualty In-
surance Conzpany, 226 Fed. (2d) 498, 6th Circuit Court of 
Appeals 1955. In that case plaintiff recovered a judgment 
against two brothers for the death of her husband who was 
killed when struck by an automobile owned and driven by one 
of the brothers. Plaintiff then brought suit upon the judgment 
to enforce its provisions against the defendant insurance com-
pany under a policy which insured the other brother. The facts 
were that the insured brother, who O\vned a restaurant, bor-
rO\\ ed his brother· s car during the time his automobile \':as 
12 
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being repaired. The insured brother drove the vehicle on a 
couple of errands and then asked the other brother to go on 
an errand for him. While the uninsured brother was on the 
errand·the accident occurred. It was contended that the car was 
covered on the theory that it was a replacement for the insured 
vehicle. The court said: 
((The judge commented in his opinion that diligent 
search had failed to reveal authoritative interpretation 
of any policy provision similar to that construed here. 
He construed the word (substitute car' to mean a car 
which was in the possession or under the control of 
the insured to the same extent and effect as the disabled 
car of the insured would have been except for its dis-
ablement. He pointed out that the Mercury belonging 
to Louis was not, at the time of the accident, in the 
possession or under the control of the insured; but 
that it was in the sole possession and control of Louis 
and being operated by him. The conclusion was 
reached, therefore, that the liability policy issued to 
Mike Zarzour, covering his 1949 0 ldsmobile, did not 
embrace liability for the injury and death of appellant's 
intestate occasioned by Louis Zarzour' s operation of 
his own automobile. 
((We think the district judge's conclusion was a cor-
rect interpretation of the policy. In our judgment, there 
was no issue of fact for presentation to the jury, as 
there was no real conflict in the evidence, and the inter-
pretation of the policy was a matter of law. In view 
of our conclusion, we consider it unnecessary to discuss 
or decide the issue of whether the policy was complied 
with in respect of appropriate notice of the accident 
and notice of the suit.'' 
In the case at bar a partner of the plaintiff firrn, C. R. 
Jacobs, testified that the partnership at the time in question 
13 
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owned between fifteen and twenty cars and that only those 
leased to the Bearings Service & Supply Company were insured 
with the defendant company. Since all of the automobiles of 
the plaintiff were not insured under the defendant's policy 
the automobile in question would not be covered under the 
automatic provision of the policy as an additional automobile 
of the plaintiff as it is excluded by the proviso that the company 
must insure all of the automobiles owned by the insured. The 
most that can be said is that the defendant company insured 
those automobiles belonging to the plaintiff which were leased 
to the Bearings Service & Supply Company. 
The Bearings Service & Supply Company was still using 
the automobile which the automobile in question was intended 
to replace at the time of this accident and had its entire com-
plement of five automobiles as called for by the lease. It had 
not surrendered that vehicle to the plaintiff, and presumably 
the plaintiff was charging the firm for the use of the auto-
mobile. Bearings Service & Supply Company had not been 
given any do1ninion over, nor had it received the custody or 
control of the vehicle, nor had the plaintiff assigned that par-
ticular vehicle to the lease or taken any action whatsoever 
to bring this vehicle within the terms of the lease at the time 
the accident occurred. There is nothing in the record or in the 
deposition \vhich would have prevented the plaintiff from 
1naking \vhatever use it chose of the vehicle and securing an-
other replacen1ent for the Bearings Service & Supply Con1pany. 
Therefore, the vehicle cannot be said to be covered as an addi-
tional vehicle being leased to the Bearings Service & Supply 
Cotn pany since the vehicle \Vas not leased at the time of the 
accident. 
14 
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Mr. Jacobs further testified that at the time of the accident 
in question the Bearings Service & Supply Company still had 
the vehicle which the subject vehicle was intended to replace, 
and was still using that vehicle. Therefore, that vehicle would 
not be covered under that provision of the policy which affords 
coverage if it replaces an automobile described in the policy, 
since it did not in fact replace such an automobile. 
CONCLUSION 
The plaintiff in this case, which owns fifteen or twenty 
automobiles, leased five of those automobiles to the Bearings 
Service & Supply Company under a lease arrangement which 
provided that the lessor should provide insurance on the 
vehicles. The Bearings Service & Supply Company provided 
insurance on the leased vehicles with the defendant company 
under a policy which provides for automatic coverage for 
newly acquired vehicles provided ( 1) it replaces an automo-
bile described in the policy or ( 2) it is an additional automobile 
and if the company insures all of the automobiles owned by 
the insured. 
The pleadings, exhibits and the deposition of C. R. Jacobs 
on file in this action show conclusively that an automobile being 
procured by the plaintiff to replace an automobile then being 
used by the Bearings Service & Supply Company was not 
covered under the foregoing provision of the policy for the 
reason that the defendant did not insure all of the vehicles of 
the plaintiff and for the further reason that the automobile 
for which damages are sought had not been surrendered to 
the Bearings Service & Supply Company and was not being 
1 5 
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operated under the lease or subject to the lease at the time 
of the accident. The damaged vehicle was not covered under 
the part of the policy providing coverage if it replaces an auto-
mobile described in the policy for the reason that the auto-
mobile which this automobile was eventually intended to 
replace \vas still being used by the Bearings Service & Supply 
Company at the time this vehicle was damaged. 
The foregoing facts were established by the plaintiff's 
pleadings and the deposition of C. R. Jacobs, a partner in 
plaintiff's firm at the time of the foregoing events, together 
with a copy of plaintiff's lease with Bearings Service & Supply 
Company and a copy of the plaintiff's insurance policy. In 
other words, the evidence comes from the plaintiff itself and 
there is no denying the facts, which show as a matter of 
law that the plaintiff is not entitled to recover. 
Rule 56 (c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure pro-
vides in a case of summary judgment, t tThe judgment sought 
shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, and 
adn1issions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show 
that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that 
the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." 
It is submitted that under the foregoing facts and the law 
\vhich is applicable thereto there v.ras no genuine issue as t~ 
any material fact and the defendant was entitled to judgment 
as a n1atter of law and that, therefore, the trial court's judg-
n1ent herein should be sustained. 
Respectfully submitted, 
CANNON AND HANSON 
Attorneys for Defendant-Respondent 
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